poprzednia
strona ------------- następna
strona From: MI5-Victim[]mi5.gov.uk Subject: MI5 Persecution: Gagged by BBC Ariels editor Date: 29 Nov 2006 18:44:45 GMT
Gagged by BBC Ariel's editor
On 25 June 1997 I wrote to Landmark Publishing Services, who deal with advertising for the BBC's in-house magazine Ariel.
I requested they run an advert "BBC Newsreaders Spying on my Home" in the Personal column. They accepted my instructions
and payment, and the following advert did indeed run in Ariel's issue of 8 July 1997.
Following the successful placement of this small ad, I wrote again to Landmark on 17 July 1997, requesting they run exactly
the same advert for 10 issues, enclosing payment. Unfortunately, the advert did not appear in any further issues of Ariel,
because Ariel's editor Robin Reynolds nixed it. Here is an email from Elaine Smith of Landmark dated 26 August 1997.
With regard to your E-mail of 22 August 1997 concerning your advertisement
in the Ariel magazine.
I was instructed by Ariel to remove your advertisement from the classified
pages as they were not comfortable with the contents of the Internet
address you supplied. I realise we have placed the advertisement
successfully for you in the past. Unfortunately this time they decided they
did not want it printed.
[snip]
I'm really sorry for the inconvenience I know this will have caused you,
but as you will understand Ariel have the last say in what is printed and
what is not.
Kind Regards
Elaine Smith
Classified Advertising Manager.
In my reply to Elaine Smith, I said;
I will speak to them directly, I believe their email address is
Ariel@bbc.co.uk. As you say, if the advert went through the first time,
then it should have gone through this time without problems. As I see it,
either what is on the website is true (which is my belief) in which case
they should allow it to be published, or else it is symptomatic of
delusions in which case again any reasonable person would recognise it
as such and its publication would not be suppressed. After all Britain
is not supposed to have censorship - it isn't a Communist country.
I also wrote to Mr Reynolds, Ariel's editor, asking him to reconsider his decision to censor my advert. He replied
with the following letter;
Since a magazine's editor has final say over what appears in the publication, there is nothing further that I can do
to encourage Ariel to accept my advert. Mr Reynold's censorship of my legitimate complaint gives the game away a bit, though.
The BBC wish people to think of them as truthful and impartial - yet when they are caught harassing one of their audience, they
resort to the same censoring tactics characteristic of the regimes they hypocritically condemn.
Użytkownik "Roman O." napisał w wiadomości
news:bn1li7$5sc$1@nemesis.news.tpi.pl...
> Po prostu kobiety są "inaczej zbudowane" (psychicznie).
Wyznam nieśmiało, że zauważyłem też pewne różnice w budowie fizycznej... ;-)
> Szkoła to też szkoła życia.
> W życiu bez kobit, "nie da rady"
Nie przeczę. Rzecz jednak w tym, że w 'normalnym' życiu stosunek kobiet do
mężczyzn wynosi (w przybliżeniu) 1:1, podczas gdy w szkole (wśród kadry)
jakieś 9:1. Jak się to ma do życia?
Cze
Mam duzo programow do grafiki!!!!!!!!!! From: Greg Palast <palast[]gregpalast.com> Subject: Here it is. The smoking gun. Date: Sat, 14 May 2005 10:34:15 GMT
The memo that has "IMPEACH HIM" written all over it.
The top-level government memo marked "SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL",
dated eight months before Bush sent us into Iraq, following a closed
meeting with the President, reads, "Military action was now seen as
inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam through military action
justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence
and facts were being fixed around the policy."
Read that again: "The intelligence and facts were being fixed...."
For years, after each damning report on BBC TV, viewers inevitably ask me,
"Isn't this grounds for impeachment?" -- vote rigging, a blind eye to
terror and the bin Ladens before 9-11, and so on. Evil, stupidity and
self-dealing are shameful but not impeachable. What's needed is a "high
crime or misdemeanor."
And if this ain't it, nothing is.
The memo uncovered this week by the TIMES, goes on to describe an elaborate
plan by George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair to hoodwink the
lanet into supporting an attack on Iraq knowing full well the evidence for
war was a phony.
A conspiracy to commit serial fraud is, under federal law, racketeering.
However, the Mob's schemes never cost so many lives. Here's more. "Bush had
made up his mind to take military action. But the case was thin. Saddam was
not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of
Libya, North Korea or Iran."
Really? But Mr. Bush told us, "Intelligence gathered by this and other
governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and
conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised."
A month ago, the Silberman-Robb Commission issued its report on WMD
intelligence before the war, dismissing claims that Bush fixed the facts
with this snooty, condescending conclusion written directly to the
President, "After a thorough review, the Commission found no indication
that the Intelligence Community distorted the evidence regarding Iraq's
weapons." We now know the report was a bogus 618 pages of thick
whitewash aimed to let Bush off the hook for his murderous mendacity.
Read on: The invasion build-up was then set, says the memo, "beginning
30 days before the US Congressional elections." Mission accomplished.
You should parse the entire memo -- reprinted below -- and see if you
can make it through its three pages without losing your lunch. Now sharp
readers may note they didn't see this memo, in fact, printed in the New York
Times. It wasn't. Rather, it was splashed across the front pages of the
Times of LONDON on Monday.
It has effectively finished the last, sorry remnants of Tony Blair's
political career. (While his Labor Party will most assuredly win the
elections Thursday, Prime Minister Blair is expected, possibly within
months, to be shoved overboard in favor of his Chancellor of the
Exchequer, a political execution which requires only a vote of the
Labour party's members in Parliament.)
But in the US, barely a word. The New York Times covers this hard
evidence of Bush's fabrication of a casus belli as some "British"
elections story. Apparently, our President's fraud isn't "news fit to
print."
My colleagues in the UK press have skewered Blair, digging out more
incriminating memos, challenging the official government factoids and
fibs. But in the US press nada, bubkes, zilch. Bush fixed the facts and
somehow that's a story for "over there."
The Republicans impeached Bill Clinton over his cigar and Monica's
affections. And the US media could print nothing else. Now, we have the
stone, cold evidence of bending intelligence to sell us on death by the
thousands, and neither a Republican Congress nor what is laughably
called US journalism thought it worth a second look.
My friend Daniel Ellsberg once said that what's good about the American
people is that you have to lie to them. What's bad about Americans is
that it's so easy to do.
Greg Palast, former columnist for Britain's
Guardian papers, is the author of the New York Times bestseller, "The
Best Democracy Money Can Buy". Subscribe to his columns at GregPalast.COM.
Media requests to CONTACT(at)GregPalast.COM.
Permission to reprint with attribution granted.
[Here it is - the secret smoking gun memo
- discovered by the Times of London. - GP]
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002 S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary,Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General,
Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C,
Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It
should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment.
Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to
overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was
worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not
convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime
expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that
regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public
was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible
shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush
wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the
conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were
being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN
route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's
record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after
military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August,
Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72
hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time
of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous
air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60
days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia
and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were
also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK
involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a
discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two
Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of
activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken,
but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to
begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US
Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this
week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military
action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin.
Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was
less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan
for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors.
This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a
legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases:
self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The
first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR
1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of
course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically
and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime
change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was
producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with
Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would
support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan
worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military
plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was
workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one,
or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said
that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the
Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military
plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK
interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK
differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the
ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in
only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military
involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many
in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It
would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political
context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any
military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we
could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we
were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds
could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed
military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background
on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam. He
would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries
in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence
update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would
consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers. (I have written
separately to commissionthis follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
PalastHere it is. The smoking gun. The memo that has "IMPEACH
HIM" written all over it.The top-level government memo marked
"SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL," dated eight months before Bush sent us
into Iraq, following a closed meeting with the President, reads,
"Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove
Saddam through military action justified by the conjunction of terrorism
and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the
policy."Read that again: "The intelligence and facts were being
fixed...."For years, after each damning report on BBC TV,
viewers inevitably ask me, "Isn't this grounds for impeachment?" -- vote
rigging, a blind eye to terror and the bin Ladens before 9-11, and so
on. Evil, stupidity and self-dealing are shameful but not impeachable.
What's needed is a "high crime or misdemeanor." And if this
ain't it, nothing is.The memo uncovered this week by the
Times, goes on to describe an elaborate plan by George Bush and
British Prime Minister Tony Blair to hoodwink the planet into supporting
an attack on Iraq knowing full well the evidence for war was a phony.
A conspiracy to commit serial fraud is, under federal law,
racketeering. However, the Mob's schemes never cost so many
lives.Here's more. "Bush had made up his mind to take military
action. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors,
and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or
Iran." Really? But Mr. Bush told us, "Intelligence gathered by
this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime
continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever
devised."A month ago, the Silberman-Robb Commission issued its
report on WMD intelligence before the war, dismissing claims that Bush
fixed the facts with this snooty, condescending conclusion written
directly to the President, "After a thorough review, the Commission
found no indication that the Intelligence Community distorted the
evidence regarding Iraq's weapons."We now know the report was a
bogus 618 pages of thick whitewash aimed to let Bush off the hook for
his murderous mendacity.Read on: The invasion build-up was then
set, says the memo, "beginning 30 days before the US Congressional
elections." Mission accomplished. You should parse the entire
memo -- reprinted below -- and see if you can make it through its three
pages without losing your lunch.Now sharp readers may note they
didn't see this memo, in fact, printed in the New York Times. It wasn't.
Rather, it was splashed across the front pages of the Times of LONDON on
Monday. It has effectively finished the last, sorry remnants of
Tony Blair's political career. (While his Labor Party will most
assuredly win the elections Thursday, Prime Minister Blair is expected,
possibly within months, to be shoved overboard in favor of his
Chancellor of the Exchequer, a political execution which requires only a
vote of the Labour party's members in Parliament.)But in the US,
barely a word. The New York Times covers this hard evidence of Bush's
fabrication of a casus belli as some "British" elections story.
Apparently, our President's fraud isn't "news fit to print."My
colleagues in the UK press have skewered Blair, digging out more
incriminating memos, challenging the official government factoids and
fibs. But in the US press ? nada, bubkes, zilch. Bush fixed the facts
and somehow that's a story for "over there."The Republicans
impeached Bill Clinton over his cigar and Monica's affections. And the
US media could print nothing else.Now, we have the stone, cold
evidence of bending intelligence to sell us on death by the thousands,
and neither a Republican Congress nor what is laughably called US
journalism thought it worth a second look.My friend Daniel
Ellsberg once said that what's good about the American people is that
you have to lie to them. What's bad about Americans is that it's so easy
to do.Greg Palast, former columnist for Britain's
Guardian papers, is the author of the New York Times bestseller, The
Best Democracy Money Can Buy.Subscribe to his columns at www.GregPalast.com Media requests to
contact(at)gregpalast.com Permission to reprint with attribution
granted.[Here it is - the secret smoking gun memo -
discovered by the Times of London. - GP]SECRET AND STRICTLY
PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLYDAVID MANNING From: Matthew
RycroftDate: 23 July 2002S 195 /02cc: Defence Secretary,
Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett,
Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair
CampbellIRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULYCopy
addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss
Iraq.This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies
should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to
know its contents.John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and
latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme
fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military
action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and
land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or
overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the
US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for
Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.C reported
on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in
attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to
remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of
terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed
around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no
enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There
was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military
action.CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on
1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.The two
broad US options were:(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of
250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to
Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus
60 days deployment to Kuwait).(b) Running Start. Use forces
already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an
Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign
beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.The US saw the UK
(and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus
critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also
important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement
were:(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF
squadrons.(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in
addition.(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to
40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from
Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.The Defence Secretary
said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure
on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most
likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with
the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional
elections.The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with
Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind
to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the
case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD
capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should
work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN
weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification
for the use of force.The Attorney-General said that the desire
for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were
three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or
UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this
case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The
situation might of course change.The Prime Minister said that it
would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to
allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the
sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were
different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political
context were right, people would support regime change. The two key
issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the
political strategy to give the military plan the space to
work.On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US
battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of
questions.For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam
used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban
warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on
Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.The Foreign
Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless
convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests
converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK
differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the
ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the
UN.John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors
back in only when he thought the threat of military action was
real.The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister
wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He
cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the
ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out
the political context to Bush.Conclusions:(a) We should
work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military
action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could
take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were
considering a range of options.(b) The Prime Minister would
revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation
for this operation.(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full
details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions
by the end of the week.(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the
Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work
up the ultimatum to Saddam.He would also send the Prime Minister
advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey,
and of the key EU member states.(e) John Scarlett would send the
Prime Minister a full intelligence update.(f) We must not ignore
the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with
FCO/MOD legal advisers.(I have written separately to commission
this follow-up work.)MATTHEW RYCROFT(Rycroft was a
Downing Street foreign policy aide)
www.buzzflash.com
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--23043757586851606202803253423628773543018468840187From: =?iso-8859-2?Q?Grendel?= <niepotrzebujesz[]bo.to.usenet> Subject: Re: Otwarta Platforma Szkolna Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2003 20:14:14 +0200
On Fri, 17 Oct 2003 11:22:01 +0200, Roman O. wrote:
> No właśnie, np 300 kont na 60 PC!
> Tu tylko _profesjonalne_ systemy serwerowe!
samba ;-)
"latające" wydruki ..i wiruski w sieci!
> Jak to się puści wolno -"Bagno".
odpowiedź: dobrze skonfigurowany squid z dodatkami
> "Szefostwo" się "Nie zna...(albo się nie chce znać)"
od tego ma swoich specjalistów. U mnie to jest tak, że jeśli dyrekcja chce
się czegoś dowiedzieć w kwistiach około-informatycznych, czy komputerowych,
wzywa obecnych w szkole informatyków (zazwyczaj 2 jest na miescu, 2
następnych dochodzi na swoje lekcje, ale nie są na etacie) i każe
przedstawić opinię w nadej kwestii.
> Też nie ma forsy, (na nic).
kwestia gospodarki pieniędzmi, wysokości obciążeń 'komitetu
rodzicielskiego' itd...
> -jakiś, co 16 kolorów potrafi ;-)
> Z szafy wyjęła i: "Zrób mi dostęp do Interenetu, bo przecież w szkole jest"
> I żeby najlepiej było "Coś do pisania"(?!)
freedos, jakiś edytorek, ew. linuksik prosty i wystarczy ;-)
> W imię -no czego?
ja właśnie wróciłem ze szkoły - siedziałem dla własnej satysfakcji, bo mi
nikt za to ekstra kasy nie wypłaci - ale z kumplem przewaliliśmy kompletnie
sbs'a, bo nieopatrznie ściągnięty sp4 roz*ił strukturę zabezpieczeń i
pomieszał w isa. A ja w międzyczasie postawiłem internetowego serwerka (2
podsieci lokalne+nat+www+php+mysql+squid+dns). Mam satysfakcję i niewiele
więcej (wkrótce użyszkodniki docenią squida z buforem 200MBram i 20GB
dysku, więc będzie mała satysfakcja ;-)). Wkrótce postawię też kontroler
domeny na sambie, żeby zacząć wkońcu kontrolować kompy stojące poza
zasięgiem sbs'a. Przy okazji mam szansę poćwiczyć (czytaj: nauczyć się
czegoś!), poeksperymentować. W żadnej normalnej firmie nie mógłbym
praktycznie sobie na to pozwolić, bo jakakolwiek pomyłka mogłaby oznaczać
destrukcję żywotnych danych firmy, albo utrudnienie w pracy, co bardzo
szybko skończyłoby się wizytą u szefa na dywaniku. A w szkole - jak coś się
sypnie, to zawsze można zrobić zajęcia bez kompów ;)...
> "Zacznijmy od spotkań z Bilem G"!
obowiązkowo ubrać ciężkie buty i nieprzemakalny płaszcz ;->